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ABSTRACT 
Political stability in Saudi Arabia is a key strategic concern of the United States 
and the international community.  As the largest producer of oil in the world and the 
country with the greatest proven reserves of oil, Saudi Arabia will be a central player in 
the world’s economic health for decades to come.  However, Saudi Arabia is also 
characterized by one of the fastest growing population rates in the world, and its 
economic and political capacity to absorb such rapid population growth is not so clear.  
There is a growing body of literature that systematically links demographic growth and 
political instability, including revolutionary instability.  This thesis draws on Goldstone’s 
model to predict whether Saudi Arabia may be vulnerable to severe instability based on 
rapid demographic change.  The Political Stress Indicator model consists of three 
conditions that must exist simultaneously for large-scale internal crises to occur; namely, 
fiscal crisis, elite dissent, and social mobilization.  Our major finding is that the Saudi 
regime will likely be able to maintain political stability in the foreseeable future.  While 
we conclude that Saudi Arabia will not face revolutionary instability in the foreseeable 
future, we caution that these problems are serious enough to closely monitor. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. RELEVANCY  
While the current focus of global security is rightfully centered on the war-torn 
states of Iraq and Afghanistan, and growing concern exists in the international 
community regarding Iranian intentions, in the long term, no other country in the Middle 
East is more important to global security than Saudi Arabia.  With over one quarter of the 
world’s proven oil supply, Saudi Arabia’s health and stability are crucial to the health and 
stability of the world’s economy as well as its global political order.  An unstable or 
revolutionary Saudi state would mean almost certain global recession and would have 
disastrous and unpredictable geo-political ramifications in a region already steeped in 
friction.  The spillover effect of a Saudi revolution on the international economic and 
political structure is as unpredictable as it is fearful. 
While the history of Saudi Arabia has always been one of struggle and strife, in 
comparison to other states in the region, the Kingdom has enjoyed relative internal peace 
and security.  Nevertheless, a brief survey of the last thirty years reveals an up tick in 
internal dissent, manifesting itself in sporadic occurrences of terrorism at home and 
abroad, and periodic--if brief counter-state movements.1  The increasing occurrence of 
events that arguably signify growing internal discord within the Kingdom prompts the 
question of Saudi stability, or lack thereof.  Indeed, circumstances within the Kingdom 
have caused some political prognosticators to boldly predict the downfall of the royal 
family and a massive disruption of the Saudi status quo.  Notable among them is former 
CIA operative Robert Baer, an open and harsh critic of the Saudi regime as well as the 
 
 
                                                 
1 Saudi Arabia has long been a hotbed of turbulence and radicalism, but never more so than it has been 
over this time period.  The storming of the Grand mosque in 1979, the Khobar towers bombing (1996), and 
the extensive involvement of Saudi citizens in the 9/11 plot, are but a few occurrences that highlight the 
numerous terror events populating the last thirty years of Saudi history, and mark a significant increase in 
the radical behavior in a small but growing number of its citizens. 
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relationship that it maintains with the United States.  Baer revealed his grim prediction of 
the kingdom’s future in his 2003 book, Sleeping with the Devil, while stating the 
following: 
All the ingredients of upheaval are in place: open borders, the availability 
of arms, political alienation, the absence of a rule of law, a completely 
corrupt police force, a despised ruling class, plummeting per capita 
income (and fabulously wealthy rulers to remind the poor exactly how 
poor they are), environmental degradation, surly neighbors, and a growing 
number of young home-grown radicals who care more about righteous 
murder than they do about living.2 
Criticisms like these prompt the question of whether Saudi Arabia really is on a 
trajectory that will result in some sort of destabilizing crisis precipitated from within.    
The plausibility of the question and the importance of the state to the region and the 
world demand that an answer be given. 
B. POPULATION GROWTH AND VIOLENCE 
A study of these same last 30 years of increasing Saudi dissidence also reveals a 
rapidly expanding Saudi population; one that has tripled since 1980. Estimates of Saudi 
population by the year 2050 sit at 49 million, up 94% from its current population of 24.1 
million.3  Barring any unforeseen catastrophic event(s) that would deplete its population 
base, Saudi demographic momentum promises ever increasing growth.  While population 
expansion (and contraction) is a normal facet of a nation’s march through history, the 
extent to which Saudi Arabia’s population is growing has become cause for great concern 
among Saudi loyalists, as the Saudi state already struggles in its capacity to properly 
house, employ, educate and provide basic infrastructure for its citizens.  This inability to 
provide basic services has admittedly been mitigated by the recent upsurge in oil prices.  
Yet, despite the windfall profits that are now pouring in, many of the same problems that 
plagued the Saudi state in the past are still existent.  To whit, “Nora al-Saad of the Arab 
News writes that Jeddah, the second largest city in Saudi Arabia after the capital, Riyadh, 
                                                 
2 Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil (New York: Crown Publishers, 2003), 29. 
3 Population Reference Bureau, “2006 World Population Data Sheet,” PRB, August 2006, 8, 
http://www.prb.org/pdf06/06WorldDataSheet.pdf  (accessed May 11, 2008). 
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“still doesn't have water piped into its houses through a standard waterworks system… 
People in Jeddah have been known to go for days without water.” Al-Saad laments that 
this failure “is a reflection of the Kingdom as a whole and how it's managed.”4   The 
Arab media has reported that average Saudis are extremely angry over the increasing 
price of food commodities such as milk, rice, fruits, and vegetables and almost 40 percent 
of the population is severely affected by escalating food costs.5  
These bits of anecdotal evidence are but a few examples which illustrate the fact 
that despite the newfound wealth of the Desert Kingdom, the structural conditions of the 
state are not improving at the rate of the Saudi government’s wealth gain.6  Additional 
problems, many of which are caused largely by demographics, but are exacerbated by 
poor governance include rampant commodities inflation, a shortage of housing for the 
poor, and massive unemployment, which is largely the result of a drastically inadequate 
state run education system.    In a nation that struggles mightily against forces that should 
be easily mitigated with the kind of wealth that Saudi Arabia currently enjoys, how much 
more will these forces affect the now oil-rich government when it is no longer enjoying 
the marvelous returns on the one finite export that it has to offer?  In the mean time, what 
will be the effect on Saudi state stability if the currently prosperous government, despite 
its wealth, continues to struggle in its ability to meet the needs of its people? And more, 
what will the affects be when the population is double its current size?  No one can say 
with complete fidelity, but two things are certain:  barring the unforeseen, the Saudi 
population will continue to grow dramatically, and some day the wells will run dry. 
C. CORRELATION OF GROWTH AND DISSENT 
The notion that population pressure alone can act as a potentially destabilizing 
source of friction between the state and its citizens is tenuous at best.  No one single 
                                                 
4 Jonathan Schanzer, ”Saudi Squander,” National Review Online (October 3, 2007): 1, 
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZGVhMmViODM0OGJlYzk1NmU0ZmQ1OGVhMmEwM2M4ZTU=  
(accessed May 11, 2008). 
5 Ibid. 
6 It must be conceded that an inherent time lag exists between a state’s gain in wealth and observable 
improvements in state infrastructure.  However, the lack of such basic services as water in a city the size of 
Jeddah reveals a misappropriation of wealth at a minimum. 
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variable can have the kind of destabilizing momentum that leads to something as extreme 
as revolution.  Nevertheless, the fact remains that the burgeoning population of the desert 
kingdom seems to be outstripping Saudi governmental capacity and diminishing the 
legitimacy of the Saudi government in the eyes of its constituents.  The House of Saud is 
simply seen as an unfair, incompetent, and squanderers of state wealth and opportunity 
by a great number of its citizens.  According to Transparency International’s 2008 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Saudi Arabia ranks 80th out of a 180 ranked countries 
with a CPI score of 3.5 out of 10 (higher scores representing less perceived levels of 
corruption).7  On the CPI scale, zero equals highly corrupt and ten equals highly clean.  
In comparison, the United States ranks 18th with a CPI score of 7.3 and Kuwait ranks 65th 
with a CPI score of 4.3. 
So while population growth alone is not a sufficient source of angst among Saudi 
citizens, it is the combination of this growth along with the perceived unwillingness and 
governmental inability to deal with this growth that is fueling the fire of frustration 
among the swelling number of marginalized and disaffected Saudi citizens.  Whether or 
not the confluence of these factors portends state crisis, break down or even revolution 
within the Saudi state is a question worth exploring. 
D. TESTING THE THEORY AND GOLDSTONE 
In order to determine whether or not the aforementioned prognostications 
regarding Saudi Arabia’s impending instability are accurate or not, the current Saudi 
situation needs to be tested against a well reasoned and empirically accurate theory and 
model that enjoys proven historical explanation.  While numerous theories attempt to 
explain state break down and revolution, particularly the causal factors that lend 
themselves to the likely occurrence of these phenomena, Jack Goldstone posits a theory 
                                                 
7 Five surveys were utilized by Transparency International to determine Saudi Arabia’s CPI score.  
“The Transparency International CPI measures the perceived levels of public-sector corruption in a given 
country and is a composite index, drawing on different expert and business surveys. The 2008 CPI scores 
180 countries.”   Transparency International, “2008 Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency 
International, News Room, In Focus section, 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table (accessed November 18, 
2008). 
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that when superimposed over the canvas of  revolutionary history has great explanatory 
value.  Goldstone, a sociologist and political scientist, conjectures that the prime mover 
of revolutionary tides begins with population pressure, grows with the subsequent 
economic impact of imbalanced resource distribution, and becomes deterministic to the 
extent that the state is unable or unwilling to effectively administrate through the crisis.  
Goldstone further posits that the adverse economic impacts of rapid population growth 
must be simultaneously coupled with elite alienation, and the mobilization of the 
common masses motivated by a counter-state agenda.8 
E. FINDINGS 
The question posed and answered in this thesis, in part, is whether or not in fact 
Saudi Arabia does fit the criteria necessary to precipitate the kind of state instability that 
Goldstone posits leads to upheaval of the status quo. The authors explicitly reveal in this 
thesis that the application of the Goldstone theory to the current Saudi state will prove not 
to portend massive state crisis as one might suspect.  This will be shown by providing a 
careful study of Saudi Arabia within the context of Goldstone’s theory of revolutions and 
their causes.  This study will reveal an intriguing explanation of how Saudi Arabia has  
been able to mitigate the potential for  upheaval by enacting measures that soften the 
applicability of requisite conditions that Goldstone posits foment instability.  While Saudi 
Arabia does have a history of instability, its political system, as revealed in Chapter III, is 
designed to allay political dissent in various ways.  Multiple structural emplacements 
exist within the Kingdom that mitigates the potential for major disruption of the status 
quo.  The Saudi rentier system is a prime example of this.  The vast resources available to 
Saudi Arabia, particularly in light of the current oil market, allow the government to co-
opt influential leaders within Islamic circles, as well as the general populace, thus 
mitigating potential sources of counter-state influence.  Where money does not work to 
subdue or suppress dissent, force does.  Public dissent and demonstration is simply not 
 
 
                                                 
8 Jack Goldstone, Revolutions and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1991), 1-62. 
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tolerated within the Kingdom, and is categorically met with heavy handed suppression by 
the state.  The rentier system and the close observation by the state of its citizens are but 
two examples of methods that the Saudi state uses to quell internal dissent.   
A study of Goldstone’s theory will reveal that three conditions must exist 
simultaneously for large scale internal crises to occur; namely, fiscal crisis, elite dissent, 
and social mobilization.  While Saudi Arabia may experience each of these destabilizing 
factors to some extent, the government structure does not allow each to exist to the extent 
that upheaval of the status quo becomes imminent.  As a result, major instability is highly 
unlikely.  
However, while Saudi Arabia is not entrenched in any sort of pre-revolutionary 
condition as some have said, the Saudi state does suffer numerous problems, many of 
which can be linked to demographic issues such as population growth (the cornerstone of 
Goldstone’s theory), making the Goldstone model an apt lens through which to consider  
the Saudi problems discussed above.  Thus, while application of the Goldstone model 
will reveal any assertion that the House of Saud is doomed to crumble under the weight 
of its own people to be largely premature, it will reveal that large scale restructuring of 
many facets of the Saudi state system are necessary if the state is to avoid the 
consequences of improper governance in the face of population pressure.  Goldstone’s 
theory provides the basis for this argument, and the potential pitfalls that accompany 
population growth will be discussed as well.  Only by knowing what the potential hazards 
are can one hope to guard against them. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
While Saudi Arabia does not suffer the likelihood of impending state crisis, but 
must undertake substantial efforts to address its burgeoning population, the methodology 
chosen here will be of the classical deductive sort, and will proceed in the following 
manner:  a general theory, along with all its accompanying premises, will be explained 
(the Goldstone theory).  Following this explanation, a detailed study of the subject to 
which the theory is to be applied will ensue (Saudi Arabia).  This detailed study must of 
course be limited to issues that are germane to the theory’s revelatory value with regard 
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to the subject.  Logically, what follows then will be an application of the theory to the 
subject in order to test for fit.  Fit in this case will be the extent to which the subject fits 
the criteria necessary for the theory to be sufficiently applicable to the subject.  While 
application of the Goldstone theory, as revealed above, will show that state crisis is not 
imminent, it is of critical importance to apply this theory, as it reveals potential fissures in 
the Saudi state system, and guides the recommendations to KSA that may improve its 
ability to affectively administrate in the face of its growing population.  This reasoning 
informs the majority of the chapter layout which will proceed as follows: 
Chapter II will explain the Goldstone theory of state crises and revolutions, 
particularly the causes, and requisite conditions that precipitate these chaotic and often 
violent events. 
Chapter III will offer a study of the Saudi state contextualized within the 
framework of Goldstone’s theory.  Application of this theory will reveal that Saudi 
Arabia contends with numerous governmental inadequacies that are aggravated by 
population pressures; but that the Saudi state has developed structural emplacements to 
mitigate factors that Goldstone believes are vital to destabilizing or revolutionary tides.  
Despite the fact that the House of Saud has developed these structural emplacements, a 
treatment of the issues that adversely affect Saudi ability to meet the needs of its 
constituents will be undertaken, as these issues have the potential to create 
demographically driven obstacles to continued stability. 
Chapter IV will offer a conclusion and summary of the results found throughout 
the course of this study. 
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II. INTRODUCING THE GOLDSTONE MODEL 
Historians have long recognized that a government, whose citizens no longer see 
the powers that be as the rightful custodians of their personal and national interests, is a 
government on the precipice, and one that given the “right” circumstances is prone to, 
and arguably determined toward, revolution or state crisis and breakdown.  In order to 
determine whether Saudi Arabia is a possible, probable, or determined candidate for just 
such upheaval, requires a suitable theoretical framework over which the Kingdom’s 
circumstance, structure, and stability can be superimposed; a framework that has proven 
to hold academic, and more importantly, pragmatic applicability.  As previously 
mentioned, the Goldstone framework of revolutionary causes will work as the lens 
through which the Saudi situation is analyzed.  As such, the basic tenets of his theory will 
be explained, so that in the subsequent chapter the Goldstone framework can be applied 
directly to Saudi Arabia. 
A. CAUSAL FACTORS OF REVOLUTION 
The natural question that should stem from an appraisal of Saudi stability and the 
assessment of whether or not the House of Saud is subject to potential revolutionary 
forces is:  “What factors determine whether or not a state is prone to revolution or state 
breakdown in the first place?” 
Several theories that attempt to explain the causal factors of revolution have been 
expounded throughout much of the twentieth century, as scholars have turned an eye to 
history and attempted to find common precursory conditions and circumstances that have 
fomented many of history’s significant state crises, to include breakdowns and 
revolutions. 
Jack Goldstone raised the bar of scholarly inquiry significantly in his attempt to 
uncover universal factors that lead to state breakdown and revolution.  While exploring 
such diverse crises as the English Civil War, the French Revolution, the fall of the 
Ottoman and Chinese Empires, as well as the Tokugawa Shogunate, Goldstone found that 
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a common thread persisted amongst these infamous state and pseudo-state breakdowns; 
population pressure and the state’s inability to politically and economically absorb its 
growing citizenry. 
Goldstone theory argues that long term demographic shifts, particularly 
population growth, can place extraordinary pressures on states that lack the capacity to 
mitigate the potential pitfalls of these population bulges, and that these pressures often 
result in state breakdown or revolution.    
The basic premise of the Goldstone argument suggests that revolutionary forces 
are generated by the simultaneous culmination of three distinct, yet interrelated 
phenomena.  They are:  (1) a state financial crisis precipitated by a rapid population 
increase and a coinciding governmental inability to raise revenue; (2) severe division 
within elite circles as well as growing elite dissatisfaction with government as resources 
and positions of power become more scarce, and (3); a high potential for mobilization 
amongst popular groups as economic pressures foment fear, frustration, and eventual 
anger toward government in the face of economic distress.  A more detailed explanation 
of each of these three factors follows, beginning with state financial crisis. 
1. Population Pressure and State Fiscal Crisis 
Demographics, specifically population growth, has proven to be the correlating 
factor that has most satisfied Goldstone’s quest to unearth the underlying cause behind 
state instability that leads to revolution.  This is not of course to say that population 
growth in and of itself explains political instability; that would be an absurd notion easily 
refutable.  No one single variable can have deterministic results in such a complex 
problem set.  Rather, the argument advanced by Goldstone is that high rate population 
growth has the effect of revealing inherent state weakness that may not otherwise be 
revealed in periods of stagnant or declining population growth.  This weakness is most 
often revealed in the form of a fiscal crisis, in which the state, largely because of 
administrative ineptitude, is unable to affectively navigate through difficulties 
precipitated by growing population pressure.  Growing populations require a growing 
amount of resources.  State governments that are unable to adapt to the needs of a 
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growing populace lack the ability to provide either the opportunity for their citizens to 
acquire resources, or in the case of rentier states, to provide the resources themselves, and 
thus face a series of dismal fiscal consequences.  
Simple economics tells us that a growing population’s obvious increase in 
resource demand will create price pressure on goods, rendering the marginal unable to 
secure the most basic of commodities as prices begin to rise.  In this same vain, an 
increased supply of labor that a burgeoning population yields creates downward pressure 
on real wages, exacerbating the difficulties created by the skyrocketing price of goods.  
Increased population also means rampant unemployment, as weak governments lack the 
administrative knowledge and infrastructure required to spur economic growth at a rate 
commensurate with demographic growth, and thus simply cannot institute or execute 
policies that create jobs and opportunity.  While these fiscal crises clearly have disastrous 
effects on popular and marginal groups that are often occupied with simple daily survival, 
the hardships created in the elite class of these societies, while of a different nature, are of 
equal extremity in the eyes of those whom are being affected.  The result of these 
hardships creates what Gurr and Goldstone call a “crisis of legitimacy”.9  In the throes of 
economic despair, all strata of society begin to fix their gaze upon their governments and 
question the form, function, and eventually the authority of those around whom they 
either freely or mandatorily coalesce.   
A general understanding of the fiscal pressures that the confluence of population 
pressure and inflexible governments creates forms the first leg of Goldstone’s framework 
in that it describes one of a triad of circumstances that Goldstone conjectures must 
combine to create an environment vulnerable to revolutionary forces. 
2. Elite Alienation 
No matter the form of government, and regardless of where a state’s political 
institutions reside along the structural spectrum, the reality of elites and their relation to 
governmental and popular dynamics must be considered thoughtfully if one is to 
                                                 
9 Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri, Revolutions of the Late Twentieth 
Century (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 331. 
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understand the true nature and role of elites within the context of their influence on 
social, political, and even economic events.  Indeed, elites can play a tremendously 
powerful role in the shaping of the societies in which they live. 
a. Elite - government Tensions 
A natural tension often exists between private elites and government, as 
competing goals, suspicions, and occasionally unrealized expectations create friction 
between these parties.  Private elites expect government to perform certain tasks that 
provide infrastructure, maintain the status quo, and yet also provide the circumstances 
and opportunity for elites to advance their own private ambitions.10  States, in order to 
fulfill these obligations, require high revenue making ability and/or a method of 
extraction, usually through taxation.  One would think, given these circumstances, that as 
long as the state has enough funds to satisfy this powerful constituency, any potential 
friction with them can be mitigated.  Unfortunately, this seemingly straight forward 
problem can be complicated when, in the eyes of some elites, government is procuring 
too many resources.11  Clearly, this worry reveals an underlying power struggle, as some 
elites seem to sense the resource gain that a state realizes as a zero sum game, meant to 
either increase the power of the state, or the influence of the elite.  In their eyes, both 
ends are not simultaneously possible.  Given this insight, the fact that tensions can arise 
in either periods of too little or “too much” resource gain is not surprising. 
b. Elite - elite Tensions 
In the face of fiscal crisis, elite-elite conflict can become a destabilizing 
force that can have tremendously adverse effects on the state as well.  Because the state is 
the ultimate source of angst and blame in times of severe fiscal crisis, the notion that 
infighting amongst elite groups creates a larger threat to the state than a united elite 
counter-state effort is counterintuitive, but several factors support this non-obvious 
conclusion.  First, is the notion that intra-elite conflicts create an environment of 
                                                 
10 Goldstone, Gurr, and Moshiri, Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, 5.  
11 Ibid., 6. 
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confusion in which the state is unable to focus counter-revolutionary efforts against a 
singularly consolidated faction.  Secondly, infighting amongst governmental and private 
elites can result in a withholding of resources by the latter group, rendering the 
government materially unable to compel acquiescence.  Lastly, private elites who are at 
odds with governmental or establishment elites tend to frame the struggle in terms of a 
counter-state ideology, which provides a grander vision to the masses and inspires 
popular mobilization.12 
Goldstone echoes, and in fact contributed to, the footnoted author’s above 
summary of these factors, noting also that a united elite working toward common 
counter-state goals would be more likely to simply stage a coup d’état and rearrange 
policies to fit their agreed upon intentions.13 
c. Elite – popular Group Tensions 
While popular groups often look to elites for guidance, leadership, and 
patronage, and to varying degrees depend on elites for resources, employment, and 
representation in the higher echelons of state society, hostilities between these groups can 
surface in the face of burgeoning population growth and economic stagnation as 
competition for resources becomes more intense.  While citizens of the state most often 
consider the national government to be the ultimate guarantor of their welfare, local 
elites, because of the direct access and visibility that their proximity affords, often exact a 
great deal of influence among popular groups, and in times of fiscal stress, bear the brunt 
of popular discontent that one would normally consider rightfully reserved for the state.  
Proximity alone does not account for the heightened tensions between these two groups 
in times of economic hardship.  Rather, the inter-group struggle for scarce resources is 
what prompts conflict.   Goldstone notes, citing Chinese, Latin American, and European 
examples, that environments of high population growth and stagnating economies often 
 
                                                 
12 James Defranzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, Second Edition (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991), 12-13. 
13 Goldstone, Gurr, and Moshiri, Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, 38-39. 
 14
find groups that are usually not in competition with each other struggling for control of 
relatively diminishing resources.14  These conflicts create fault lines that in times of 
stability don’t exist.  
That these conflicts create instability between elites and popular groups is 
of no surprise given the parochial interests of each, however the effect that these types of 
conflicts have on the state are of much greater consequence to stability than any class 
division that may result from inter-class struggle for resources.  The extent to which state 
stability is affected depends largely on the elite class’s ability to frame the circumstances 
that brings about this type of conflict in terms that either directly or indirectly hold the 
state responsible.  If counter-state elites can sway the sentiments of popular groups in 
their favor under the banner of a uniting ideology, a redirection of popular anger away 
from elites and toward the state can have destabilizing consequences, as a united counter-
state effort has the real ability to take hold. 
These three types of elite conflict have varying degrees of effect on the 
stability of the state.  Clearly, in the case of elite-government conflict, the counter-state 
intentions that can result, while potentially threatening, are only as effective as the 
resources that elite groups can muster to begin genuine counter-state efforts.  In this vain, 
it is vital for elite factions to co-opt, inspire, organize and then deploy popular groups.  
The ability to do so greatly expands the financial and human capital base required to 
effectively launch revolutionary movements.  The ability to form a cohesive counter-state 
movement among popular groups however may be very difficult if several elite groups 
with conflicting ideologies or agendas are present.  Presumably, disparate elite groups 
struggling for the affections of the masses would result in the fracture of popular groups 
into smaller, competing, and thus weaker factions.  Squaring this supposition with the 
notion that disparate elite groups create the most destabilizing conditions for the state is 
difficult.  On the one hand, elite groups are seen as more destabilizing if they are in 
 
                                                 
14 Jack A. Goldstone, “Population and Security:  How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent 
Conflict,” Journal of International Affairs vol. 56, no.1 (Fall 2002): 9-10, 
http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/pdf/demographics_capstone.pdf  (accessed November 7, 2008). 
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conflict with one another, yet this conflict has the potential to fracture and negate the 
power of popular groups.  Perhaps this dynamic at least partially explains why 
revolutions are exceedingly rare events. 
3. Mass Mobilization Potential 
The third and final phenomenon that Goldstone conjectures leads to revolutionary 
conditions is the previously mentioned notion of mass mobilization.  While financial 
crises and elite alienation are necessary occurrences in Goldstone’s model, they are not 
sufficient alone to stimulate the amount of upheaval required to weaken states to the point 
that they are vulnerable to existential counter-state threats.  Wide and deep movements 
within the population are essential.  To this end, a study of mass mobilization potential is 
essential if one is to accurately assess a state’s vulnerability to anti-government forces. 
When assessing mass mobilization potential Goldstone offers three factors for 
consideration that he argues determine the likelihood of popular involvement in counter-
state efforts.  These three factors are:  real wages, age structure, and urbanization.15  The 
strength of Goldstone’s model is that if one can be supplied with historical raw data 
concerning these three variables, back testing can be conducted in order to determine if in 
fact these variables combine to show a high correlation between what Goldstone terms 
mass mobilization potential (MMT) and actual historical cases of revolts and/or 
revolutions.16  While Goldstone constructed a mathematical model in which MMT could 
be quantified,17 a detailed analysis of the mathematics is not important here.  What is 
important is a general understanding of how each variable affects the potential for 
common citizens to collectively act in a fashion contrary to state interests.  With that in 
mind, a brief discussion of each variable and its effect on mass mobilization potential is 
required. 
                                                 
15 Goldstone, Revolutions and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, 134. 
16 Peter Turchin, Historical Dynamics, Why States Rise and Fall (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2003), 141. 
17 Ibid., 143. 
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a. Falling Wages 
It bears repeating that there is nothing deterministic about the growth of a 
state’s citizenry other than that more people will live there.  Rather, population growth 
only becomes a problem when the state is either unable or unwilling to expand its 
resource base to the extent that the growing population cannot maintain a standard of 
living consistent with previous and less populace generations.  In short, a state must be 
able to increase its carrying capacity at a rate equal to or greater than the resource 
demand its growing population will place on it.  In the modern nation-state, this is usually 
accomplished through such means as the purchase or development of technology, free 
trade and specialization, and the advancement of an open-market economy in which the 
forces of supply and demand can find equilibrium in the domestic and world markets.  If 
the state is administratively unable, or ideologically unwilling to incorporate methods 
such as these to increase state resource capacity, the inflationary pressures that result can 
impel citizens to mobilize in protest.  Indeed, history is littered with examples—from 
food riots to the forced exile of kings.18 
b. Age Structure and Mobile Youth 
While no magical proportion of youths must exist in order to spawn so 
called “youth movements”, Goldstone advances the argument that small increases in the 
numbers of youth in a given a society can have large effects on the potential for social 
mobilization.19  In a hypothetical example, Goldstone parses percentages of a society into 
age categories.  Noting that members of advanced age groups are less likely to join 
movements unless a certain proportion of society is already involved, he shows how a 
large cohort of mobilized youths can have a cascading effect on these older and otherwise 
hesitant segments of society that would in other circumstances choose to air their 
                                                 
18 Dozens of examples of mass mobilization as the result of inflationary pressures, particularly on 
foodstuffs are existent within history.  Food riots are commonplace events in the Middle East and Asia.  
The “exile of kings” is an allusion to the King of England’s forced exile from London in December, 1641, 
as because of economic depression and the subsequent question of his legitimacy, he and his family were 
forced to leave for safety reasons. 
19 Turchin, 137. 
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grievances privately or not at all.20  Thus, it would seem that population growth, given 
the “right circumstances,” can be destabilizing in two ways according to Goldstone.  
First, it places pressure on governments that cannot absorb a growing citizenry, and 
secondly, it floods a society with an element, that when presented with unsatisfactory 
conditions, has no compunction regarding the assembly of its members to either convey 
dissent or demand reformation. 
c. Urbanization 
The third factor that Goldstone conjectures increases mass mobilization 
potential is urbanization.  Indeed, it makes intuitive sense that the convergence of 
multitudes of  citizens into close proximity provides an ease of communication, a 
common experience from which to establish similar world views, and a streamlining of 
logistical requirements that would otherwise not be available if these same citizens were 
to be spread throughout the rural countryside.  These factors alone would seem to go a 
long way toward explaining why urbanization promotes mass mobilization; however 
Goldstone posits that urban settings alone do not facilitate collective action.  Instead, 
according to Goldstone, the state’s ability to either assist or deter its citizens is what 
determines whether or not urbanization will play a decisive role in the potential for 
mobilization.21   
Assistance to citizens is accomplished through effective state 
administrations that provide resources in the form of employment opportunity, proper 
sanitation, public utilities, and security.  If these requisite conditions can be met by the 
state the growth of population centers poses no threat, and is in fact beneficial to state 
interests.  Goldstone reinforces this claim with the following:  “Indeed, if real wages are 
above average, then urban growth and a youthful population can be stabilizing factors, as 
urban growth attracts families to better circumstances and a youthful population enters 
the labor force under favorable conditions.”22  
                                                 
20 Turchin, 137. 
21 Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, 139-140. 
22 Ibid., 139. 
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Deterrence in the context given above implies the ability to quell or 
disallow counter-state collective action in any form.  The ability to mitigate mobilization 
is primarily achieved through fear, and at the root of this fear is the perception that the 
state is strong enough to enforce its will.  If the state has the resources and the resolve to 
effectively promulgate this perception public dissent will be anything but commonplace. 
Indeed, in highly authoritarian or police states, public demonstrations are often met with 
such brutality that their occurrence is nothing more than a short lived anomaly.  Of course 
the ability to deter in this context implies that the state must have strong administrative 
capacity.  Police forces, military units, and other vehicles of censorship that authoritarian 
governments use require a tremendous input of resources. 
While the extent to which urbanization is apparent in a society or state is 
an important variable to consider when attempting to ascertain the potential for mass 
mobilization, it is equally important to consider the political and economic strength of the 
state as well.  States that lack the administrative and economic capacity to absorb citizens 
into population centers may be forced to confront a great deal of public dissent, and if 
these same states lack the ability to quell or silence these movements, greater troubles 
may lie ahead.  Because urbanization is an increasingly important phenomenon given the 
population explosion in Saudi Arabia and the world generally, Chapter IV is devoted 
entirely to the further study of this subject. 
B. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce Jack Goldstone’s model of 
revolutionary causes in order to establish a general, historically proven framework over 
which Saudi Arabia’s current and specific conditions can be superimposed.  As such, in 
the following chapter Goldstone’s model will be the lens through which modern day 
Saudi Arabia is viewed and critiqued.   
While Goldstone’s model specifically addresses pre-industrial states, it is the 
authors’ belief (as well as Goldstone’s) that the model can be applied to modern nation 
states as well, as the theory hinges around two general phenomena that have been 
consistent and important factors in the determination of state stability throughout the 
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ages; demographics and state structure.  Goldstone, noting the importance of applicable 
analogy in the context of model building, states that initial conditions that are similar, 
regardless of era, can expect the actors of their respective ages to stage common 
responses.  He states, “If the salience of those characteristics is great, then one can 
reasonably expect that in a wide variety of historical contexts, actors will respond 
somewhat similarly to them, and their likely actions can thereby be predicted or 
explained.”23 
With this affirmation of the model’s applicability to modern states, let us consider 
the demographic, economic, social, and political structure of modern day Saudi Arabia, 




                                                 
23 Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, 57.  
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III. APPLICATION OF GOLDSTONE’S REVOLUTION MODEL 
TO SAUDI ARABIA 
As discussed in Chapter I, a body of political pundits and international affairs 
analysts believe the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is potentially on a course that will 
lead toward increased instability, and possible revolution.  While Professor Jack 
Goldstone has never overtly stated that just such a possibility exists, application of his 
framework to the modern Saudi state may provide valuable insight to those interested in 
Saudi stability.  While Goldstone’s framework has been largely applied to pre-industrial 
states, common variables associated with his theory have been used as explanatory 
markers of concern within the context of the modern Saudi state. To wit, he notes that 
Saudi Arabia bears watching because of its demographic trends and imbalances between 
education and economic opportunities.24 
While Chapter I revealed that in the near term, particularly because of recent 
windfall oil profits, Saudi Arabia does not appear to be prone to revolutionary forces, 
numerous structural problems require attention and redress by the royal family if 
potential instability is to be averted, or at a minimum, mitigated.  Acknowledgement of 
the many issues that potentially threaten internal accord will not be easy however, as the 
kingdom’s leadership is collectively ensnared in a classic “kings dilemma”, in which it 
will be forced to institute reforms that may jeopardize the legitimacy of the throne and 
family.  The balancing act that the house of Saud must perform is as unenviable as it is 
necessary to long term stability within the kingdom.   
The focus of this chapter is to conduct a critical analysis of the Saudi state using 
Goldstone’s revolution theory as a conceptual framework in order to determine potential 
instability from within.  Because Goldstone’s model for state breakdown begins with 
population pressure, a study of Saudi demographic shifts is required.  Subsequently, the 
                                                 
24 Jack A. Goldstone, “Demography, Environment, and Security,”  In Environmental Conflict, edited 
by Paul Francis Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch, 84-108 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000) 98, 
http://books.google.com/books?id=zMm9UketgwAC&pg=PA84&lpg=PA84&dq=Goldstone,+Jack+A.+%E2%80%9C
Demography,+Environment,+and+Security.%E2%80%9D&source=bl&ots=Kx6oPa3umO&sig=g4TyK_Hvb5vSP5nG
RI90qyf8_QQ&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result  (accessed June 4, 2008). 
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economic impacts of population growth in Saudi Arabia, such as imbalanced resource 
distribution, unemployment, and lack of opportunities, will be discussed at length, as 
these issues highlight the Kingdom’s inability and, at times, unwillingness to effectively 
administer.  Because Goldstone’s framework hinges on the simultaneous phenomena of 
elite alienation and the mobilization of the common masses to counter the state’s agenda, 
an in depth study of elite Saudi groups is offered, with specific attention paid to the 
disincentives that mitigate the potential for both elites and popular groups to mobilize 
with counter-state intentions.25   
With the above framework revealed, the chapter is laid out in the following 
manner:  Section one will review population changes and demographic pressures. Section 
two will examine the destabilizing impact of economic downturns caused by population 
pressure.  Section three will inspect the Saudi state, revealing what amounts to 
precipitous state ineptitude and blatant corruption. Section four will discuss Saudi elite 
groups and examine their ability to mobilize the masses.  Lastly, section five is an 
assessment of the structural emplacements used by the state to mitigate internal pressures 
that have allowed the house of Saud to survive and maintain authoritative control of the 
Kingdom.  We include this section because the ruling family has been able to reduce and 
in some cases control the pressures that Goldstone believes lead to revolution, mitigating 
the negative effects of population pressure and economic hardship.  
A. POPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES IN SAUDI ARABIA 
1. Demographic Trends 
While Saudi population figures were inflated in the 1970s and 1980s by the 
government in order to project the image of a strong economy and workforce, in the early 
1990s, the opposite occurred.  Saudi government sources minimized population estimates 
                                                 
25 Goldstone, Revolutions and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, 1-62. 
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in order to downplay the predicted economic and political pressures that stemmed from 
high growth rates and overpopulation stressors.26  
No matter what population estimates the Kingdom may provide now or in the 
future, the general consensus is that Saudi Arabia’s population is projected to almost 
double from 2000 to 2015; due largely to a disproportionately high ratio of females who 
will soon enter their traditional childbearing years.27  This current population growth is 
the result of momentum achieved through earlier growth in the previous three decades. 
The result is that the population has increased dramatically from 7 million in 1980 to 
almost 28 million today.28  Growth rates are projected to only decrease slightly from 
1.9% in 2008 to 1.3% in 2025.29  That little is available in the way of family planning 
measures only contributes to the demographic momentum that the state is experiencing.30  
In 2008, the overall population was estimated at 28.1 million and is expected to increase 
to 35.6 million by 2025 and other estimates have a greater increase in 2025 to 48.5 
million.31 Regardless of the exact level of increase, Saudi Arabia will most likely 
experience a significant increase in population for the foreseeable future that will 
challenge Saudi government and society. 
While the Saudi growth rate can be partially attributed, as previously mentioned, 
to a lack of state funded birth control programs, the increase in health standards also 
                                                 
26 Saudi government sources and independent foreign census sources such as the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census International Database, which tracks population and demographic trends, are closer in estimates.  
Adam N. Goetz, “Demographics: The Downfall of Saudi Arabia” (Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, December 2003), 13-16, 
http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/cgisirsi.exe/Fri+May+30+12:29:20+2008+/SIRSI/0/520/03Dec_Goetz.pdf 
(accessed March 21, 2008).     
27 Alan Richards, “Socioeconomic Roots of Radicalism?: Towards Explaining the Appeal of Islamic 
Radicals” Naval War College Review Vol. LV, No. 4 (Autumn, 2002), 26, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00102.pdf  (accessed April 8, 2008). 
28 Ian Bremmer, “The Saudi Paradox,” World Policy Journal, Volume XXI, No. 3 (Fall 2004), 25, 
http://worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj04-3/Bremmer.pdf (accessed May 30, 2008).  
29 U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Table A-4. Population by Region and Country 1950-2050,” U.S. 
Census Bureau, A-7, http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/wp-02.pdf  (accessed May 30, 2008). 
30 Bremmer, 26. 
31 U.S. Bureau of the Census, A-7 and U.S. Bureau of the Census, “International Database, Country 
Summary: Saudi Arabia,” U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country/saportal.html 
(accessed May 30, 2008). 
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explains the Saudi population surge.  For instance, in 2005, the number of deaths per 
1000 was recorded at six, while the birth rate per 1000 individuals, while decreasing 
slightly, was significantly larger, at 37.32  This significant growth poses challenges for 
the government, and maintaining popular support could hinge on how it responds to the 
needs of the masses, as well as elites, in the coming years.  Tables 1 and 2 depict 
estimates of Saudi Arabia population and demographic trends. 
Population (1950-2050)             
(Midyear population in thousands.  Figures may not add to totals because of rounding)    
  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2002 2010 2025 2050 
Saudi Arabia 3,860 4,718 6,109 9,949 15,847 23,513 30,546 48,517 91,112
Table 1.   Historical and Projected Population for Saudi Arabia. 
From U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Table A-4. Population by Region and Country 1950-
2050,” U.S. Census Bureau, March 2004, A-7, 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/wp-02.pdf (accessed May 30, 2008). 
 
Saudi Arabia Demographic Indicators       
(Midyear population in thousands.  Figures may not add to totals because of rounding)   
  1995 2005 2008 2015 2025 
Population           
  Midyear Population (in thousands) 19,967 26,418 28,161 31,560 35,669
  Growth Rate (percent) 3.5 2.3 1.9 1.4 1.3
Fertility       
  Total Fertility Rate (births per woman) 4.7 4.1 3.9 3.4 2.9
  Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000 population) 31 30 29 26 22
  Births (in thousands) 615 781 812 820 789
Mortality         
   Life expectancy at birth (years) 73 75 76 77 79
   Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births) 20 13 12 10 7
   Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births) 23 15 14 11 8
   Crude death rate (per 1,000 population) 4 3 3 2 3
   Deaths (in thousands) 70 69 71 77 93
Table 2.   Demographic Indicators for Saudi Arabia. 
From U.S. Bureau of the Census, “International Database, Country Summary: Saudi 
Arabia,” U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/country/saportal.html 
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As noted in Chapter II, specific demographic trends tend to increase the risks of 
political conflicts.  Large shifts in age distribution, particularly a growing ratio of youths, 
is just such an example.  According to Goldstone, youth cohorts or “youth bulges” cause 
cascading effects on the state that can prove to be destabilizing in states that struggle to 
assimilate growing populations.  In short, a rapid shift in age structure causes a 
proportionally swift growth in the size of the labor force, stressing the national economy 
because of the state’s inability to supply employment opportunities.  The lack of 
employment opportunities combined with the growing population of educated youth 
aspiring for upward mobility and elite status creates more tension as competition stiffens 
among members of society.33  As if this were not enough to stimulate potentially 
destabilizing conditions, urbanization--for all practical purposes a second order effect of 
population growth, brings the reality of these economic conditions into painfully sharp 
focus, making the potential for social mobilization much more likely. 
Inarguably, a major youth bulge does exist in Saudi Arabia.  The percentage of 
youth population will continue to increase.  Depicted in Figure 1 are population pyramids 
by gender that graphically depict Saudi Arabia’s present and future “youth bulge” in 
demographics. 
 
                                                 
33 Goldstone, “Demography, Environment, and Security,” 87. 
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Figure 1.   Population Pyramids for Saudi Arabia (2008 and 2025). 
From U.S. Bureau of the Census, “International Database, Country Summary: Saudi 
Arabia,” U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/cgi-
bin/ipc/idbpyry.pl?cty=SA&maxp=2123615&maxa=100&ymax=300&yr=2008&yr=202
5&.submit=Submit+Query   (accessed May 30, 2008). 
 
Consequently, if history is any indicator, Saudi youth are more apt to mobilize, 
and perhaps call for change and reform. Parenthetically, there is the contention that youth 
are more prone to use violence and that they utilize current information age technology 
such as the internet in higher numbers; which opens them up to being influenced by 
contrary opinions and ideas than the older generations. 
B. ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
1. Economic Conditions 
Demographic and subsequent economic pressures are revealed in several areas 
throughout the Kingdom, including unemployment, inflation, food prices, and the 
economic disparity between the elites and the masses.  The discontent of the youth and 
the population in general is increased by the fact that most people now live in cities with 
poor infrastructure and lack of opportunities for employment. Almost 90% of the 
 27
population is considered urban and 80% of the population lives in the kingdom’s three 
largest cities: Riyadh, Jidda, and Dammam.34   
Public services and utilities are being overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of 
customers and eventually greater oil revenues will have to be utilized to stem the 
problems.  Reporter Kim Murphy wrote from Riyadh about the urban conditions: 
The dozen years since the Persian Gulf War have seen slums grow up on 
the outskirts of Jidda and Riyadh, the capital. Beggars hawk bottles of 
water at intersections.  Penniless women huddle in strips of shade outside 
their crumbling mud-brick houses, begging for money.  Many families in 
the capital are so poor they can’t afford electricity.  Raw sewage runs 
through parts of Jidda.35  
With segments of the increasing urbanized population living in adverse conditions 
and the prospect of self-created economic prosperity an unrealistic notion for people, 
fertile ground for dissent is created.  How the house of Saud responds to their poor will 
serve to either contribute to or mitigate internal dissent and calls for reform.  However, 
while urbanization can be a destabilizing phenomenon, the growing urban structure of 
Saudi Arabia may in some small way encourage state stability, as the self-identity of 
Saudi citizens shifts toward its new urban roots and away from traditionally tribal 
affiliations that have historically been reluctant to embrace the Saudi state.  Successful 
co-optation of city dwellers may encourage urban solidarity and thus indirectly contribute 
to state loyalty by undermining these potentially dangerous tribal affiliations.36 
2. Oil Revenues and the Rentier State 
The distribution of oil revenues is a contentious issue and underlies all aspects of 
the Saudi state, to include the economic, political, religious, and social.  Petroleum 
revenues account for 45 percent of GDP, nearly 75 percent of the government’s budget 
                                                 
34 Kim Murphy, “Saudis Quicksand of Poverty,” Los Angeles Times, May 16, 2003, Section A-1 print 
edition, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/may/16/news/war-poverty16  (accessed October 24, 2008).  
35 Ibid. 
36 F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994), ch 2, 6, 
http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/programs/icas/gause/gausetoc.html accessed June 6,  (accessed June 6, 2008). 
 28
revenues, and 90 percent of export earnings.37  Saudi Arabia can be characterized as a 
rentier economy or state, meaning that rather than extracting revenue from its citizens,  
the state distributes a portion of the revenue it receives (almost exclusively on the 
international oil market) to its citizens.  Because the government does not need to tax 
their citizens to fund their government, military, and social programs, existing 
mechanisms of accountability and connections between the state and society are highly 
atrophied, rendering the government autocratic and less responsive to the needs and 
requests of its people than extractive governments often are.38  The result is a state that 
subsidizes its own incompetence and buys complacency and compliance from its citizens.  
In times of fiscal good fortune, the arrangement is quite efficient. 
However, in times of fiscal contraction, the inherent structural problems that exist 
in rentier states come to the fore, highlighting the fundamental disconnect between the 
state and its citizens.  While global demand may continue to buoy or increase the cost of 
crude for the foreseeable future, a decrease in demand, perhaps due to technology that 
creates other energy sources, could have dire consequences on state stability.  Because 
Saudi Arabia is exposed to variations in the price of oil, it is difficult to predict with any 
fidelity when the Royal family may again be subject to state fiscal crisis, but the fiscal 
crises experienced in the 1930s and 1990s bear witness to the fact that desperate 
economic times in the kingdom seem to inspire desperate and destabilizing actions within 
small but violent portions of its citizenry.   
As long as oil prices remain high and the world markets are dependent on OPEC 
oil to run their societies, the Saud family will have a large resource base to work with, 
allowing them to mitigate the issues of their rentier state.  Co-optation of elites and 
dissenters alike will continue, and the maintenance of legitimacy will occur through 
scrupulous distribution of the Riyal. 
                                                 
37 Central Intelligence Agency, “Saudi Arabia - Economy - Economy Overview,” The World Fact 
Book, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/sa.html (accessed August 25, 
2008). 
38 Class notes from Professor Glenn Robinson, SO4830 Political Violence in the Middle East, Naval 
Postgraduate School, June 3, 2008. 
 29
3. Unemployment 
Another factor that contributes to internal dissent and state weakness is 
unemployment.  There are varying sources on a precise unemployment rate for Saudi 
Arabia.  The current rate is estimated at 13% among Saudi males (local bank estimate); 
however other sources estimate unemployment as high as 25%.39 If there is actually a 
decrease this would indicate that the Saudi regime programs to curb unemployment are 
succeeding, or it could be more indicative that as oil revenues increase, unemployment 
rate decreases.  However, it seems that money alone is not the only factor that explains 
Saudi Arabia’s unemployment problems.  If extremely high state revenues could solve all 
their problems then unemployment would be almost nonexistent.  With the modernization 
of the country and the high availability of education, there is a large group of young 
people competing for public sector jobs.  Can the state afford to employ all these people 
or will private sector growth increase substantially in order to create more economic 
opportunities?   
Also part of the equation is the Saudi workforce’s cultural attitudes and question 
of whether they are willing to work in many of the private sector jobs and traditional 
foreign worker jobs, such as those supplied by the state-run oil industry.  With a high 
number of young, unemployed males, the country is concerned that they could drift into 
crime, drugs, or religious extremism.40    
A major issue often discussed is the reliance on the foreign labor force.  
According to political scientist, Gwenn Okruhlik, foreign workers constitute perhaps 90 
percent of private sector jobs and 70 percent of the public sector jobs.41  For a nation with 
high unemployment rates, utilizing foreign workers for the majority of jobs is dangerous.  
An al-Saud solution to this problem, thus far slow in its implementation, is the 
                                                 
39  Central Intelligence Agency, “Saudi Arabia – Economy – Unemployment rate,” The World Fact 
Book, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html#Econ  (accessed 
August 25, 2008).    
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“Saudization” of labor, which is a program designed to replace the country’s six million 
foreign workers with Saudis.  The Saudi Labor Department is pushing businesses to hire 
more Saudis and is attempting to enforce quotas.  Success of this program remains to be 
seen. Private companies are resisting and complain that foreign workers are cheaper and 
work harder than Saudi citizens.42  
The education system was developed through the state use of oil revenues but the 
fundamental issue is that the education system is failing to equip the young people with 
the right skills.  The curriculums at most schools and colleges are heavily influenced by 
the conservative Wahhabi religious establishment and do not reflect the needs of society.  
It is estimated that 80% of college students graduate in history, geography, Arabic 
literature and Islamic studies and not enough graduate in science, engineering, and 
medical fields.43 Also, the education system focuses on mostly memorization instead of 
critical thinking and analysis, again rendering young Saudi graduates ill-equipped to 
compete in the work force. 
4. Rising Inflation and Food Prices 
In recent years, inflation has become a major issue in the Kingdom, and the 
effects of rising inflation and government mismanagement have the potential to breed 
dissent among an increasingly young, urbanized population.  While the wealthy segments 
of society are able to adjust to higher living costs the poor are less able, and have 
experienced a declining quality of life while simultaneously witnessing the state bringing 
in unprecedented oil revenues.44   
A case can be made that the poor of the country have suffered during a stagnated 
economy in the 1980s and 1990s.  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an estimated 
1.25% per year between 1981 and 2001, from $155.1 billion in 1981 to $186.5 billion in 
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2001; these are hardly numbers indicative of a vibrant economy. At the individual level, 
the average GDP per capita shrunk roughly 2.5% per year.  Defined in nominal terms 
GDP per capita went from $10,330 in 1989 to $7,743 in 2001.45   
This trend of poor economic growth has changed recently with oil revenues 
increasing dramatically.  In 2008, oil prices fluctuated up to $140 a barrel and back down 
to $70 a barrel.  This temporarily increased gross domestic product (GDP) per capita but 
in recent months GDP per capita has decreased.  The Saudi government has to plan to 
save and not overspend during the good economic times to make up for times of lower oil 
revenues. 
When oil prices were high the Saudi government could utilize additional revenues 
to mitigate internal dissent among most segments of society.  With oil prices decreasing 
again, this can have negative consequences for the Saud family.  State stability issues will 
likely increase if any or some of the following conditions occur: 1) the price of oil 
continues to drop significantly, 2) other oil dependent countries develop their own oil 
reserves or alternative energy sources, or 3) regardless of oil revenue; segments of the 
population question the legitimacy of the regime because of corruption and perceived un-
Islamic governing. 
Inflation has increased significantly over the last few years, with the Riyal pegged 
to the decreasing US dollar.  Real inflation rates in the Kingdom were estimated at 16% 
in 2005 and increased to 19.9% in 2007.  Saudi society experienced minimal inflation 
rates of less than 1% in the 1980s and 1990s and the high inflation rates have come as a 
shock, particularly to lower and middle class families.46 
Adding to the situation are rising food prices.  While this phenomenon has 
occurred globally it has particularly affected Saudi Arabia.  According to economist Brad 
Borland, food prices have increased dramatically in Saudi Arabia:  
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From 1983 to 2003, food prices increased by just 8.4 percent; since the 
start of 2004 they have surged by 16.8 percent. Rising food prices affect 
all households. As consumers tend to buy similar baskets of food on a 
regular basis, these price changes are very noticeable. Despite government 
controls on the prices of certain basic foodstuffs, such as bread, milk, 
flour, wheat and barley, it is likely that poor households are suffering the 
most from the price rises, because food accounts for a larger proportion of 
their total spending.47 
C. STATE INEPTNESS AND CORRUPTION 
After reviewing the economic impacts on state stability it is necessary to briefly 
discuss the excessive level of corruption and mismanagement that exists in the Kingdom, 
and its impact on both society and government.  A great disparity between the well off 
and the poor in Saudi society exists and feeds a public perception in the world and Saudi 
Arabia that there is widespread corruption and mismanagement in the government.  
When asked by Angus Reid Global Monitor: Polls and Research if they agreed with the 
statement “corruption is a big problem in my country,” 64% of Saudi citizens agreed.48  
A significant majority and cause for concern.  Also, according to a report from the World 
Bank on governance indicators, Saudi Arabia has improved in controlling corruption 
from 1996 to 2008.  In 1996, the Kingdom was ranked around 38% in controlling 
corruption and improved its ranking to 60% better than countries worldwide.49 Even 
though the government is reducing corruption, it still exists at high enough levels to 
effect public perceptions negatively and reduce effective governance.  It is likely that 
corruption and mismanagement could further enflame pre-existing internal dissent.  
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Saudi royal expenditures are often discussed by dissident networks.50  The 
extravagant spending of members of the royal family varies from million dollar parties, 
high priced yachts, and shopping sprees in the West.  Saudi oil revenues continue to fill 
personal bank accounts of the house of Saud and there is no independent control or 
accountability.  Also, mismanagement, failure of economic reforms, wasting of public 
money, and absence of plans for economic growth are sources of complaint from some 
people.51  
Saudi oil wealth is at an all time high, generating large and unplanned for profits 
to the kingdom.  How much of this revenue is invested into the country for the good of all 
and how much goes to either buying off opposition or maintaining the Saud family’s 
extravagant lifestyle?  According to a Saudi dissident living in exile in 2003, only one-
third of oil revenues go towards the country and the rest is used by the Saud family to 
maintain its lifestyle and regime survival.52 According to the international version of the 
New York Times, the International Herald Tribune, a significant portion of revenues is 
misused or wasted by the regime.53  It seems that the distribution of oil revenue is 
problematic for the Saud regime today and will continue to enflame dissent against the 
house of Saud. 
D. ELITE DISSENT AND POTENTIAL TO MOBILIZE THE MASSES 
According to anthropologist, Jack David Eller, the actions of elites are 
consequential to the collective mobilization and defining of the masses into groups (p. 
45).54  Because elite groups often operate as a vanguard to mobilize masses, elites  
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serve as political activists that “provide the organizational principle and the militancy that 
move the group to specific action - or lead a cadre of other elites who act in the name or 
interest of the people.”55  
In this section, we will analyze five of the most relevant elite groups as they relate 
to the nature of the state and potential for revolution.  Figure 2 depicts the elite structure 
and summarizes their potential to mobilize the masses. 
 
Figure 2.   Elite Groups in Saudi Arabia. 
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1. Saudi Royal Family Members 
The Saud royal family dominates the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and has 
maintained its autocratic hold over the state since the consolidation of power in the 1920s 
by Abd al-Aziz Al Saud (Ibn Saud), who formally founded the nation in 1932.57  The 
royal family is the primary elite group, and the other elites in Saudi Arabia have been 
sufficiently co-opted, bought-off, or sanctioned to date in order to maintain Saud 
dominance.  According to Saikal: 
Power entirely rests with a small oligarchy of elderly brothers, which 
presides over a royal family of some 7,000 members. The oligarchy, 
which has a determining share in every aspect of Saudi life and society, 
has treated the Saudi oil wealth as its private property and spent it in the 
way that it has seen most fit.58  
In the early twenty-first century, the royal family still relies heavily on material 
wealth, access to oil revenues, personal networks, and its size and degree of internal 
cohesion to maintain power.  With the increases in oil revenues beginning in the 1950s 
the Saud family gained the material means to establish a rentier state, which effectively 
obligated the people to the state for their livelihood. Additionally, many royals are in 
charge of the most influential government ministries, ministers of less important 
ministries, deputy or assistant ministers, governors, and members of the Royal family 
Council.59  The personal networks of the royal family members consist of formal and 
informal connections with the other elites throughout the various provinces of the 
country.  The sheer size of the royal family gives it the ability to influence several areas 
of the country with blood ties, furthering the Saud strategy of inter marriage to 
consolidate power.  Of course, this family growth has the potential to cause increasing 
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internal competition among the ruling elite.60  This competition could be positive and 
negative.  Positive because with competition it seems likely that the more capable 
members will rise to positions of greatest power, and negative because the infighting 
could increase in severity creating internal instability. 
The possibility of internal instability among royal elites remains a great cause for 
concern for some of the above reasons.  Is their a potential for major dissent or rifts in the 
Al-Saud family?  The last succession of power took place on August 1, 2005 with Crown 
Prince Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz taking over after King Fahd’s death. King Abdullah 
rules the country today and next in line is Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud.  
According to a BBC News report, there is tension between King Abdullah and Crown 
Prince Sultan, but it does not appear to be anything serious enough to fracture the 
government.  Both are members of the same generation as King Fahd and the kingdom 
will have to prepare for another succession of leadership sooner rather than later.61  It 
does not appear likely that the Al-Saud family will turn against one another to the extent 
that a revolution or civil conflict would develop.  Of course competition and jockeying 
for power and influence will continue among the Al-Saud elites, and how this plays out 
will affect the type and pace of reforms that take place in Saudi Arabia. 
2. Ulama (Sunni, Religious Elite) 
The Ulama are the second most influential and powerful elite group in the 
Kingdom.  The most influential Ulama are recruited from the same families for 
generations.  They possess a high level of traditional legitimacy and the ability to support 
or undermine the policy decisions of the regime.  According to Volker Perthes, “their 
main capital was their capacity to shape public opinion and to mobilize public support”62  
The Al-Saud family relies on their state controlled Ulama to back their decisions with 
fatwas (religious opinions that carry great weight and influence in the highly religious 
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society) in difficult situations, such as the 1991 Gulf War when U.S. troops were 
stationed in the Kingdom, and in the crackdown of jihad extremists after September 11, 
2001.63 
The religious clergy have been bureaucratized into a functional cog of the Saudi 
state machine; a majority of these religious leaders have been co-opted to the extent that 
their primary purpose is to support the regime, and as a result their subservience to the 
ruling family is far outweighed by any autonomy they might otherwise enjoy.64  In 1971, 
King Faysal established the Council of Senior Ulama, which was comprised of twenty 
leading Wahhabi scholars, mainly from the Najd region where Wahabbism originated.  
This council is chaired by the grand mufti and is considered the highest religious 
authority with its fatwas having a nearly legislative effect.65   
While political dissention will not likely come from state sponsored Ulama, it 
could originate from the younger, less co-opted clergy.  Some of these elites are 
discussed in the Islamo-liberal reformists section.  Another source of dissent from within 
may come from extreme Islamic elements.  The elites of this group have little political 
power but continue to challenge state stability through the distribution of anti-regime 
information and physical attacks on royal family members and sites in the Kingdom.  
Some examples are Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia attacks since September 11, 2001.  Some 
religious reform is under way by the ruling family in order to “define Islam and 
delegitimize its more extreme elements.”66  It appears this has been successful, and 
jihadist groups such as AQ have de-legitimized themselves by killing innocent Saudi 
citizens during terrorist attacks. 
The traditional Ulama are a loyal instrument of the state and will remain so as 
long as the regime continues co-opting, providing support for traditional Wahhabism, and 
does not attempt to modernize and grant reforms too quickly that are perceived as un-
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Islamic by the Ulama and conservative segments of society.  Also, Wahhabi Islam 
remains a “double-edged sword for the family.”  Islam is their source of legitimacy; 
however, it restricts what the Saud family members can do.67  Their excesses and 
instances of un-Islamic practices weaken their own legitimacy in the eyes of many 
conservative Islamists. 
3. Tribal Leaders 
Tribal elites can be considered the losers in the political struggle of the country.  
Inter and intra tribal social statuses have not changed, and these groups generally have 
little influence in public debate and state politics.  The Saud strategy, executed effectively 
in the twentieth century and continuing today, was to replace tribal identity with the 
religious ideology of Wahhabism and to settle nomadic tribes (urbanization).68  Also, the 
nature of the rentier state allows the regime to co-opt tribal elites.  However, tribal 
leaders maintain some influence with people affiliated with their tribes and are able to 
influence political opinions.  Tribal elites’ political capital has diminished significantly, 
and according to Perthes, tribal elites risk losing their people to the growing number of 
Saud princes, who are linked by maternal descent and have established their own 
patronage system.69 
In the midst of weakened tribal ties, the tribal elites’ ability to mobilize masses is 
significantly weakened, and it appears unlikely that this elite group can or would benefit 
by challenging the Al-Saud royal family. 
4. Shi’a Leaders 
In present day Saudi Arabia, the Shi’a elite are a small group of notables who are 
permitted some stake in the political process because of their power ties, but in return are 
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expected to control their communities.70 With the minority status of Shi’a and their 
political, economic, and social suppression over time, the threat of serious dissention 
from the Shi’a population of Saudi Arabia, which is estimated at about 10-15 percent of 
the country’s total population, does not seem likely in the near future.  However, in the 
past, there have been instances of Shi’a uprisings.  In these circumstances, the ruling 
Saud family turned to state force to suppress Shi’a riots in 1979 and 1980, and “after 
massive internal disputes” that resulted from various socioeconomic crises. These Shi’a 
riots were inspired by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and encouraged the Shi’a to take to 
the streets in the eastern province, where the vast majority of their population inhabits.  
The most radical elements of this movement formed a group called “Organization of the 
Islamic Revolution” and their objective was to resist against the ruling Saud regime.  
Even in this volatile situation, the majority of Shi’a were not calling for the overthrow of 
government but were protesting for “equality and recognition.”71   
Also in the 1980s, a campaign that escalated terrorist activities and propaganda 
against the regime began that demanded equal rights and respectful treatment for Saudi 
Shi’a.  This group known as the “Saudi Shi’a Underground Movement for the Liberation 
of the Arabian Peninsula” enjoyed popular support in the eastern oil province, where 
Shi’a comprise about 50 percent of the population.  This group ceased all activities in 
1993 after signing an agreement with King Fahd in 1993.  The king agreed to improve 
the treatment of Shi’a, provide development funds to their areas, and halt Wahhabi clergy 
anti-Shi’a messages.72  Shi’a opposition can be divided into groups; those that remained 
since the 1980s, and those who returned with amnesty.73 
The royal elite realized in the 1990s that “accommodating the Shi’a opposition 
could easily temper a serious conflict,” which resulted in the state engaging the Shi’a in a 
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number of methods to include incorporation, adaptation, and cooptation. Of course state 
force is still used when necessary to quell outright dissention.   Also, any Saudi policy 
that includes representation from Shi’a leadership is met with religious opposition from 
the Sunni ulama, who refer to the Shi’a religious elites as rafida (rejectionists) and have 
even issued a number of fatwas calling the Shi’a apostates.74 
The government has accepted the Shi’a as an actor in Saudi society and politics, 
even inviting their leadership to the “National Dialogue” conferences, which is an 
opportunity for the various elite groups to discuss issues at a national level.75 In turn, the 
select elite leadership from the Shi’a minority has worked within the framework of the 
state in seeking greater autonomy and political power within their communities.76  They 
see themselves and frame their views as citizens of Saudi Arabia and openly express their 
“allegiance to the regime.”   According to Maximilian Terhalle, it remains to be seen 
whether the current paradigm of “reconciliation” will continue.77   A small group of Shi’a 
elite have been given a stake in Saudi politics, although not much of one; however, they 
will most likely continue to work within the current status quo of Saud rule because of 
the benefits of economic incentives, limited political influence, and the willingness and 
likelihood of state use force to eradicate dissention. 
5. Islamo-Liberal Reformists 
This elite and political group has only come onto the scene in the last few years in 
Saudi society.  Their calls for reforms have even gained support from some among the 
Royal family, to include King Abdullah, who initially supported some of their suggested 
reforms while Crown Prince.  The constituency is made up of former Islamists and 
liberals; Sunnis and Shi’a, whose primary objective is to achieve democratic reforms 
within an Islamic framework while changing some Wahhabi doctrine that they deem to 
be exclusionary and undemocratic.78   
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According to Lacroix, The emergence of an “Islamo-liberal” trend began as early 
as 1998: 
..with activists and reformists reformulating their calls for political reform 
in an Islamo-democratic fashion while expressing unprecedented criticism 
of the Wahhabi religious orthodoxy, thus insisting on the necessity to 
combine political reform with religious reform.79 
Key to their survival and limited success is the framing of their objectives in 
Islamic terms and serving as a counter-balance to Islamic extremism in the Kingdom.  
Saudi society is generally conservative and any reforms that challenge Wahhabism will 
have to be incremental and carefully framed. 
The catalyst for Islamo-liberal reformism was the events of September 11, 2001.  
Prior to September 11, the elite intellectuals had to express their views informally in 
private businesses, internet forums, and articles in the press.  After the attacks they were 
able to take advantage of a more pervasive political climate, which resulted in the 
creation of political manifestos and petitions.80  In January 2003, a group of Islamo-
liberal reformists carefully drafted a petition that stated the internal problems the country 
was facing and requested the implementation of political, economic, and social reforms.  
Political demands included:  
..the separation of powers; the implementation of rule of law; equal rights 
for all citizens regardless of their regional, tribal, and confessional 
background; national and regional parliaments; and complete freedom of 
speech, assembly, and organization.   
Other major economic demands were: a fairer distribution of wealth, measures 
against corruption and waste, and diversification of oil revenues.  Last was the demand 
for a national dialogue conference for all regions and social groups.81  The reactions of 
Saudi elite were positive, including then Crown Prince Abdullah who approved the 
national dialogue conference.  He acknowledged the need for reforms but stated the 
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process would take time.82 King Abdullah seems to be reform minded but also 
understands that he cannot move to quickly at the risk of alienating other members of the 
Royal Family and the religious elite of the Ulama. 
The Ulama will compete with the reformers to maintain the status quo that 
supports their power and influence and promotes conservative Wahhabism inside and 
outside the kingdom.  The ultimate goal for these intellectual elites is for the nation’s 
foundational myth to be reframed along the lines of inclusive principles of a greater Saudi 
Arabia.  This would ultimately result in the reduction of the exclusive influence of 
Wahhabism.83  However, the intelligentsia have little political power and ability to 
influence and mobilize the masses.  As a result, their strategy is to work within the 
current autocratic system and petition for reforms respectfully over time.  The Al-Saud 
family has to take great care in its reactions to these Islamo-liberals, because if 
democratic-type reforms are fully implemented this will reduce the religious elite’s 
influence and power, which will most likely jeopardize their tribal-Wahhabi legitimacy 
that has kept them in power.84 
E. STRUCTURAL EMPLACEMENTS TO MITIGATE PRESSURES 
The Saudi regime has developed a number of structural emplacements to maintain 
its control, and without these structural emplacements the house of Saud would have long 
ago been forcibly challenged by an internal revolution, and in all probability deposed. 
Significant to the continued existence of the state is that it does not allow individuals or 
groups to publicly demonstrate or develop political organizations for mobilization.  
Individuals can say and do many things in private, but public or group dissent is not 
tolerated.  The state has to stop any dissenting social movements in advance to prevent 
loss of influence and power in the long term.  In this section, we will discuss the  
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following key mitigations to internal dissent: 1) State leveraging of tribalism and Islam, 
2) military structure for internal security, and 3) government control of media to 
influence both domestically and regionally. 
1. Islam and Tribalism 
Saudi Arabia expert and writer F. Gregory Gause III, writes that Islam and 
tribalism were both mechanisms used to form the state, and that they remain instrumental 
in the politics of the country, facilitating regime control.  He posits that the rentier nature 
of the state greatly mitigates the autonomic spirit required of a state’s citizens if they are 
to successfully mobilize with counter-state intentions: 
The state now provides directly to the individual many of the benefits that, 
in the past, came from the tribe.  The balance of power between the central 
authorities and the tribes is now squarely on the side of the former. 
Likewise the institutions of Islam are now much more dependent upon the 
state and much more a subordinate part of the state apparatus …85 
Gause goes on to discuss “the taming of Islam and tribalism” as a deliberate 
process that is essential to the regime’s control.86 The house of Saud uses Islamic rhetoric 
and symbols to legitimize its control, framing its existence as the rightful protectorate of 
Islam as well as its constituent faithful. For example, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is 
sometimes called "The Land of The Two Holy Mosques", which is a direct reference to 
its role as guardian and administrator of Islam’s two holiest sites, Mecca and Medina.  
Also, it declares the Qur’an as its constitution, clings to religious justification for its rule, 
and frames virtually all statements within the context of Islam.  The claim of religious 
justification dates back to 1745, when Muhammad ibn Saud formed an alliance with 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a religious scholar who preached a strict, fundamental 
interpretation of Islam. The alliance was based upon Al-Saud following the ‘Wahhabi” 
interpretation of power consolidation, which settles for nothing less than utter domination 
of competing ideologies and peoples.87 
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The key element that has remained since the formation of the nation is the Saud 
regime’s reliance on the Ulama.  Acting largely as instruments of the state, the Ulama are 
often used to justify state policies (religious sanction), and provide political legitimacy. 
The resultant mutual dependence between the state and the Ulama greatly reduces the 
likelihood that the Ulama would ever form an opposition movement broad enough to be 
an existential threat to the House.  The vast majority of the Ulama are employees of the 
state and hold positions as judges, teachers, scholars, and preachers in local mosques.  
There exists an extensive bureaucracy of religious institutions that helps the regime 
maintain control of the country.  These institutions exist to manage the holy sites of 
Mecca and Medina, the religious courts, and Mutawaa-in (religious police) who enforce 
the strict interpretation of Islamic social norms.88 Likewise, the regime supports and 
finances the Ulama and its bureaucracy. This loyalty has paid off in times of state crises; 
particularly in regard to the suppression of extremist opposition groups in the Kingdom. 
According to Gause, the relationship between the regime and the religious 
institution has evolved to the point that the Ulama are completely subordinate to the 
state.89  It seems that the Ulama is significantly compensated, and will continue to 
support the regime as long as the regime does not attempt to institute too much 
modernization reform that could be perceived as un-Islamic. 
The second key area that the regime is able to control and utilize to its advantage 
is tribalism.  While tribal support was essential for the Saud family to establish the state 
and its rule, the administrative expansion and resultant military growth experienced by 
the state over the last 80 years has rendered tribes and their leaders largely ineffectual and 
without influence.  Any vestigial influence that tribes may enjoy has been mitigated   
with oil money.  Like the Ulama, this class of Saudi elites has succumbed to the need to 
remain relevant, and has thus become a willing victim of the state’s intentions.   As long 
as the Saud coffers remain full, the regime will continue to buy off and co-opt tribal 
leaders.90  
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89 Gause III, Oil Monarchies, ch2, 5. 
90 Ibid., ch 2, 5-8. 
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Concerning the state’s ability to mitigate tribal loyalties that might be 
destabilizing, strategies have been adopted by the regime to dampen the potentially 
adverse influence that tribal affections may foment.  Because tribal sheiks and leaders can 
be very influential amongst their people, it is vital that the state co-opt them; the failure to 
do so invites disaster.  A rentier state is easily able to do this through the simple use of 
state funds.  While the notion that tribal loyalty can be bought is laughably unrealistic, 
the tribe can in effect be “rented”, and it is through tribal leadership that this transaction 
occurs.  By engaging leadership and allowing them to be the conduits through which state 
funds reach tribal affiliates, state regimes are able to provide resources to their citizens, 
and more importantly, to allow tribal leadership to maintain an air of importance amongst 
their own people.  This is vital, as placation of tribal elite through artificial elevation of 
importance provides security to both parties, because it engenders a sense of loyalty to 
the regime. 
2. Internal Security Structure  
A major concern for the Saudis is a military coup or revolution backed by the 
military, given the history of coups in the Arab world.  The regime relies upon the Saudi 
Arabia National Guard (SANG or White Army) for protection for royal family members, 
protection against internal threats, protection of key infrastructure and resources, and 
protecting the holy places of Mecca and Medina. The SANG is the King's private army 
consisting of soldiers from religious supporters and tribes that are loyal to the king and 
royal family.  It’s commanded by a high ranking member of the royal family and 
typically stationed near cities to deter internal dissention.91  According to foreign policy 
analyst Anthony H. Cordesman, the Saudi National Guard has performed well and has 
been a major asset in its internal security roles.92   
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Internal security forces are critical in any authoritarian regime, including Saudi 
Arabia.  A recent event illustrating the seriousness and competence of Saudi internals 
security occurred in June 2008.  According to the Saudi Interior Ministry, authorities 
arrested “520 Al-Qaeda operatives who had planned to strike oil facilities and economic 
centers in eastern Saudi Arabia.”93 The continued success of internal security elements is 
necessary to prevent a terrorist attack on key oil infrastructure, which would reduce 
national confidence in the regime and temporarily reduce oil revenue needed to maintain 
the state patronage networks.  According to Gause, internal security forces “have been 
able to contain the challenge to regime security presented by local affiliates of al-Qaeda” 
and AQ remains a risk but will not topple the regime.94 
3. Government Control of Information and the Media 
In the information age, with Saudi Arabia’s increasing population boom and large 
“youth bulge,” Saudi’s information strategy is critical to survival of the Saudi regime and 
suppression of internal dissent.  Like many things in the kingdom, the regime is able to 
use a portion of the extensive oil revenues to control and influence media in Saudi Arabia 
and the Middle East.   
The state completely controls Saudi broadcast media; however, newspapers are 
mostly privately owned, with the government controlling the hiring and firing of 
newspaper editors.  The Ministry of the Interior exerts considerable control over what is 
written and who works where.  A few Saudi newspapers have demonstrated boldness in 
publishing articles critical of low level mismanagement.  Further, calls for reform have 
occasionally been voiced.  However, for the most part, any media coverage that is 
                                                 
93 “According to the report, the leader of the cell, who bore a message from Al-Qaeda deputy leader 
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negative or critical of the royal family or Islam is off-limits and not tolerated.95  
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ),  
If a journalist steps out of line, he is fired and unable to find work. Dozens of 
editors, writers, academics, and other media critics have been suspended, dismissed from 
their jobs, or banned from appearing in the Saudi press when they offended the 
government or important religious constituencies.96 
Since the 1990s, Saudi Arabia has extended its influence over pan-Arab media to 
counter political movements that challenge the Saudi regime by using its oil wealth to 
buy-off media or develop alternative media.  Its information strategy is to utilize 
influenced media to filter out criticism of Saudi foreign and domestic policy and provide 
a more moderate analysis of issues and events.97  Part of the regimes media strategy is to 
control internal dissent by also focusing efforts on shaping public opinion in the Arab 
Middle East because of the regional and global spread of information.  Saudi Arabia has 
acquired whole networks and has influence with advertising.  It is estimated that 40-70% 
of the region’s advertising is spent in Saudi Arabia.  Arab networks, television channels, 
and publications are not going to risk jeopardizing their cash flow by upsetting the 
authoritarian government of one of the largest Middle East economies and thus, in recent 
years there has been a tampering down of Saudi criticism.98 
Internet and satellite television are extremely popular and widespread in the 
kingdom.  The government filters thousands of pornographic, political, and news sites.  
However, many families access the web uncensored by dialing out of country providers 
or through satellite feeds. According to CPJ more than 90 percent of homes have access 
to satellite dishes.99 
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Censorship or filtering the global market of ideas is a necessity for authoritative 
regimes, including Saudi Arabia.  The regime allowed public access to the internet in 
1999, only after years of careful consideration and developing control mechanisms to 
censor internet content.100 KSA filtering focuses on political, social, and security/conflict 
and the state blocks a large amount of content on the internet.101 Figure 3 depicts internet 











Figure 3.   Internet Content Filtering Choices  
After Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas. Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact 
of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2003), 115. 
 
The purpose for social filtering is to deny citizens access to opposing ideas or 
material that is considered immoral by conservative Wahabbi standards.  The intent is to 
block pornography, gambling, and other immoral topics and material.    The purpose of 
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political and security/conflict filtering is to minimize political dissent and to deny 
opposition groups and terrorists such as AQ in Saudi Arabia the use of the internet to 
share information, recruit, and mobilize.   
Saudi Arabia utilizes “SmartFilter as a filtering proxy” and they also block access 
to specific URLs.  The government does allow citizens to write to the government to 
request access to a website because it was blocked erroneously or to request that sites be 
blocked.102   Allowing citizens some say in “internet censoring” is a state attempt to 
reduce the public frustration with not having full freedom to surf cyberspace.  Not 
surprising, Saudia Arabia’s internet censorship measures are not entirely successful.  The 
use of overseas proxy servers is common, with many individuals circumventing state 
blocking and censoring mechanisms.  Kalathil and Boas reference a Saudi official who 
admitted that “many Saudis with internet access are visiting sites that detail corruption in 
the royal family or that belong to overseas opposition groups.”103 
Research from Kalathil and Boas in “Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The 
Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule” supports Farris and Villenueve’s findings 
and the results of their study showed that few civil society organizations use the internet 
and that the state filters social and political information it deems inappropriate such as 
pornography, criticism of the royal family, and material offensive to Islam. Also, the 
state’s primary use of internet is for putting religious material online and developing e-
commerce and foreign business investment.104  
The internet poses some challenges to Saudi legitimacy and authoritative rule, 
however, its use by civil society organizations and dissent groups is very limited.  
Foreign-based anti-Saud groups utilize the internet to maintain web pages that challenge 
Saud policies and excesses.105 As discussed earlier, only individuals with access to 
overseas proxy servers would be able to view those sites and probably do so at risk to  
 
                                                 
102 Faris and Villenueve, 15-16 and Kalathil and Boas, 115. 
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105 Ibid., 116. 
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their livelihood and personal freedom.  Overall, the Saud regime will continue to censor 
the internet and benefit from its technology to promote and export Wahhabist Islam and 
develop e-commerce.106 
In the area of satellite television, two of the more popular media outlets are Al-
Jazeera and Al-Arabiya.  Al-Jazeera has been criticized by the Saudi regime and has been 
a platform for Saudi dissent in the past but it appears to be toning down its anti-Saudi 
rhetoric.  One example is the regime accusing Al-Jazeera of “inciting terror” by showing 
a tape of suicide bombers before they carried out an attack on a residential compound in 
Riyadh.107  Al-Jazeera remains one of the biggest media challenges to the Saudi 
government.   
Al-Arabiya is the state sponsored alternative to Al-Jazeera that began in 2003.  It 
came on air after the September 11, 2001 attacks and just in time for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  Saudi leaders were correct in foreseeing another round of anti-Saudi criticism 
similar to the rhetoric after the 1991 Gulf War.108  The station’s goal is to balance 
coverage and still maintain a large viewership in the Arab world.  Generally, with the 
spread of media in the Arab world, the potential for spreading dissenting ideas and 
accessing anti-Saudi information is greater for the Saudi people and cannot be fully 
censored.  Perhaps over time the free flow of ideas and information will have the effect of 
weakening state stability and bring about major reforms.  The regime’s information 
strategy is critical to mitigating internal dissent. 
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Whether or not Saudi Arabia is on the precipice of a destabilizing crisis has been 
the question that this thesis has attempted to answer.  Saudi Arabia, as has been shown, is 
rife with endemic obstacles to internal security.  Population growth continues to increase, 
and while showing signs of slowing still threatens the state’s ability to adequately 
accommodate its burgeoning population.  State infrastructure is being stressed beyond its 
ability to support its own people, as evidenced by its crumbling urban centers and 
massively over-populated educational apparatus; merely two examples of the many 
detailed in the preceding chapter.  This population growth has also shown a 
corresponding increase in unemployment, a continually nagging problem within the 
Kingdom.  Given the seeming increase in internal violence and dissent that has 
accompanied the structural problems created by the growth in population over the last 30 
years, the natural question that arises is whether or not this relationship portends even 
greater instability in the future. 
The problems facing the Saudi state at the outset of this thesis seemed to mirror 
greatly those conditions that Jack Goldstone posited must be present for state crises to 
precipitate.  Primarily, the inability of the Saudi state, despite its vast wealth, to 
accommodate its growing citizenry seemed to echo Goldstone’s assertion that population 
driven financial crises almost categorically result in political instability.  While Saudi 
Arabia does enjoy great wealth due to its oil revenue, its inability to affectively 
administrate to the extent that this wealth reaches its citizens would seem to create the 
potential for social and political upheaval.  For this reason, Goldstone’s model was 
applied to Saudi Arabia with every expectation that massive upheaval would be predicted 
in the future.  This was not the case. 
After applying Goldstone’s model, a revolution in Saudi Arabia does not appear 
likely in the near term.  The basic premise of the Goldstone argument as explained in 
Chapter II is that the following three conditions must exist simultaneously:  (1) a state 
financial crisis precipitated by a rapid population; (2) severe division within elite circles 
as well as growing elite dissatisfaction with government as resources and positions of 
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power become more scarce, and: (3) a high potential for mobilization amongst popular 
groups as economic pressures foment fear, frustration, and eventual anger toward 
government in the face of economic distress. 
The financial crisis element of condition (1) does not exist in Saudi Arabia at this 
time because oil revenues are at an all time high, but if oil revenues decrease dramatically 
and Saud corruption and mismanagement continue than a state financial crisis could 
develop.  The other element of condition (1), population increase and demographic 
pressures does exist, and is a major challenge.  A growing, young, and large population 
will demand more from the state and will most likely push societal norms within the 
heavily Wahabbi influenced country.  Economic impacts will have to be mitigated and 
planned for to relieve population pressures. The state will have to improve efficiency, 
provide greater economic growth and jobs, and improve education to better serve the 
population and the overall society.   
Conditions (2) and (3) do not exist at a significant enough level to contribute to a 
high potential for revolution.  It can be argued that Saudi Arabia is a strong state or at 
least not as weak as many Middle East analysts believe because they have developed a 
rentier state that is able to mitigate the traditional elements of Middle East state power, 
namely Islam and tribalism,109 which could otherwise act as potential sources of dissent 
and rebellion.  The vast resources available to the regime, particularly in light of the 
current oil market, allow the Saud government to co-opt influential leaders within Islamic 
circles, thus mitigating potential sources of counter-state influence.  There subsists some 
dissention from various elite groups, but none have both a high level of disenchantment 
and the ability to mobilize the masses to overthrow the regime. Instead, most elite groups 
have some stake in the political process to influence the Saudi royal family and society.  
Over the long term, these groups will continue to compete and seek a larger political 
stake in affairs, eliminating any desire to form counter-state factions, as it would contrary 
to their own interests. 
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Another factor that mitigates the potential for increasingly unstable conditions is 
the Saudi regime’s ability to leverage the structural emplacements it has created; from the 
maintenance of legitimacy through Islamic and tribal mechanisms through clever 
contextual framing, to co-opting and buying elites and key groups like the Ulama and 
tribal leadership through state sanctioned rentier policies and under the table corruptive 
pay-offs.  Where money and coercive influence leave off the Saudi state’s ability to 
manipulate its own media apparatus begin.  The regime utilizes a proactive and carefully 
cultivated information strategy to buy and influence media both domestically and 
regionally.  The state’s ability to censor any material that it deems as contrary to Saudi 
interests is vital to its ability to control information and drastically reduces the potential 
for a massive counter-state consciousness or voice to form.   
In conclusion, within the context of Goldstone’s framework, the only condition 
that seems to be cause for concern for the Saudi regime is the economic impact that its 
growing population will have on the state.  As discussed throughout, massive structural 
economic problems still exist within the Kingdom despite the massive wealth that the 
Saudi regime enjoys.  These problems however are far from insurmountable.  It is not the 
amount of resources that confines the Saudi government’s ability to provide for its 
citizens, but rather it is lack of ability to effectively administrate and subsequently 
appropriate funds to the benefit of the state and its citizens. 
Even if, however, no attempts to change the economic status quo of the Kingdom 
were made, according to Goldstone’s framework state crisis would still be far from 
imminent, as conditions (2) and (3) would have to occur simultaneously.  As shown, 
Saudi Arabia has effectively mitigated the potential for this to occur.  As a result, 
according to Goldstone’ revolutionary framework, no great threat of Saudi instability 
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